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Introduction
The goals of this paper are twofold: having written an
introduction into the Sociology of Religion in the middle
of the 1990s 1, I want to delineate some important ana-
lytical developments in this field that have happened
since – developments that have come quite unexpected
to many of us. In order not to reduce myself to a theo-
retical sketch, I want to exemplify these theoretical de-
velopments that are most closely linked to changes in the
state and perception of religion in modern societies. In
talking about modern society, I should apologise for the
fact that my perception may be somewhat biased: It fo-
cuses on phenomena in Central Europe as well as in the
Anglo-Saxon speaking societies. I am well aware of the
diversity of religion beyond this scope even within Eu-
rope, i.e. between societies that have been coined by
Roman-Catholicism, such as Portugal, Ireland or Aus-
tria, societies with mixed confessions, such as Germany
and Switzerland, societies that have been influenced by
Protestantism, such as Sweden and Norway, and finally
those under the (recovered) influences of Orthodoxy,
such as Greece or Russia – let alone the difference of so-
cieties in other areas of the world and with respect to
other religions. Despite all these differences I would hold
1 KNOBLAUCH, Hubert (1999): Religionssoziologie. Berlin/New
York: de Gruyter. A Croatian translation of the book has been pub-
lished in 2004.
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that the phenomena discussed here are or relevance in other societies, i.e. in Western
societies. 
Resacralisation and Secularisation
To all of us, this has been a decade that has changed the face of religion fundament-
ally. Already in the 1970s Daniel Bell has announced a resacralisation of society when
Protestant Fundamentalism had developed to become a political force in the United
States.2 In the 1990s, Huntington argued that religions would take on epochal signifi-
cance. Following Fukuyamas thesis on the end of history, he argued that now religions
will become the major forces for conflicts between different cultures. Nation states will
remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of
civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be
the battle lines of the future. In his view it is primarily religions that define cultures
and cultural areas. 3
Huntington’s thesis gained world prominence since the events of 9/11, and it was
received for it anticipated the increasing globalisation of religion, a phenomenon high-
lighted by Beyer. Nevertheless it has been seriously attacked to oversimplifiying cul-
tural borders, for ignoring important differences in and between religions and in over-
stressing the role of violent conflicts. Attacks have been so harsh as to even reproach
him that the thesis has been received so widely as to even contribute to the situation
it claimed to analyse in the way of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
However, there is evidence that indicates for an increasing importance of religion.
In contradistinction to Luckmann’s thesis of privatisation, Spanish sociologist José
Casanova has called this process the de-privatisation of religion. By de-privatisation
he understands the process by which religion leaves its place in the private sphere in
order to participate in the ongoing debates and legitimation in the public sphere (1994:
65f.): Religion supports the defence of rights and liberties or defends traditional life-
forms from bureaucratic attacks. The fact that religion turns to be an actor on the pub-
lic sphere proves to Casanova the move towards a public religion that is located be-
tween the public sphere and the institutions of the civil society. Public religions this
transcends the borderline between public and private in that it may range from indi-
vidual mysticism to organised denominations and from established to spontaneous
event-like organisation. Public religion thus may also mean that religion becomes
politiced, part or/and actor within the political debate – and also, as we know, a
nowadays partly unknown subject for the debates of political parties, for legislation
2Bell, Daniel (1977): «The return of the sacred? The argument on the future of religion», in: British Jour-
nal of Sociology 28, 4, 419-49.
3 Cf. Huntington, Samuel P. (2002): The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Schuster & Schuster. Using various studies of history, Huntington divided the world into the «major»
civilizations in areas, defining their civilisations as essentially the world religions dominating in these areas,
such as Western Christendom Europe, North America, Australia, Orthodox Christendom (Eastern Europe,
Russia), the Muslim world (Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia), the Hindu civilisation (India, Nepal),
the Sinic civilisation (China, Korea, Vietnam), and the Buddhist civilisation (Sri Lanka, Thailand, Mongo-
lia etc), Japan being considered a hybrid.
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and for the executive. Moreover, religion played and plays an important role in the re-
ethnicization we witnessed after the end of the cold war. The newly emerging new po-
litical entities, such as the Polish democratic state, Bosnia or Croatia referred to reli-
gion as one major element of their legitimacy (or the illegitimacy of the other).
Although already described to some detail in my sociology of religion, I have to turn
again to the new paradigm since this is still one of the most prominent ways to explain
the increased importance of religion. New paradigm is a self-label for a number of
scholars who base their analysis of religion on rational choice theory. That is, they as-
sume that actors are oriented by a utilitarian principle. Their decisions depend on the
expected costs and gratifications of actions in such a way as to maximise the gratifi-
cations and to minimise their expenditures. This principle, new paradigm represen-
tatives maintain, is also valid in the field of religion: This-worldly costs (such as pay-
ments to churches, time of participation in rituals and investments in religious edu-
cation) are calculated with respect to other-worldly compensations, such as eternal life,
redemption or salvation. Since these compensations are not available in this world, re-
ligion relies heavily on trust. One way to guarantee trust consist in organising com-
munities of believers who are the more trustworthy, the fewer the this-worldly uses
are they yield from being member of the organisation. This implies that churches who
demand fewer costs may be less trustworthy when it comes to other-worldly com-
pensations than sects. 
Since, to this view, religion is governed by utilitarian actions as is economy, the
market seems to them as the perfect social order for religion. Almost in the manner of
neo-liberal economists, they suggest that the more competition there is in terms of
religious offers, the more demand can be satisfied, i.e. the more attractive religion may
be. Vice versa, the regulation of the market and tendencies of monopolization reduce
the attractiveness of religion to actors and lead to increasing indifference and secular-
ization.4
This way, the new paradigm claims to explain differences e.g. in the recruiting of
priests: As a rule, in those areas in which Catholicism competes with a number of re-
ligions, there are more persons prepared to become catholic priest – a decision which
implies quite heavy personal costs, as we know. The model, however, even addresses
more general differences. Thus, the reason for the decline of religion in Europe is at-
tributed to the monopolistic and heavily state regulated situation of religion in Europe,
whereas the American situation proves that competition and a free market yield a
lively religious situation. 5 On this background, the new paradigm even attacked Eu-
ropean sociologists of religion for prematurely proclaiming secularisation as a feature
of modern society since it is, they argue, only a feature of European societies and, in a
way, an exception. Although not being part of the new paradigm, Peter Berger was one
of the first to stress these differences: “In Western Europe, if nowhere else, the old sec-
ularisation theory would seem to hold.” (Berger 1999: 9f).
4A thesis that is also put forward by one of the inventors of the market model. Cf. Peter Berger: The desec-
ularization of the world, in: Peter L. Berger (Hg.): The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion
and World Politics, Washington 1999, 1-18.
5Rodney Stark/ James McCann: Market Forces and Catholic Committment: Exploring the New Paradigm,
in: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 32, 2 (1993); Stephen Warner: Work in progress toward a New
Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States, in: American Journal of Sociology 98
(1993), 1044-1093.
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It comes to no surprise that the critique of the new paradigm was particularly harsh
in Europe. Thus the British sociologist Steve Bruce criticises the deficiencies in the em-
pirical analysis of quantitative data by the new paradigm. The data, he argues, does
not back the thesis of increasing religiosity.6 He maintains, to the contrary, that the
secularization process is continued.7
In fact, one should distinguish between different kinds of secularization. Internal
secularisation refers to the fact that people are less and less believing in religious
dogmas, and their conduct looses the dependence on ethical imperatives of church
teachings. External secularization denotes the decreasing importance of religion in the
life of the people: Church rituals, praying, crosses in private houses etc. are increas-
ingly loosing their importance. Again, one should possibly tell this external secular-
ization from structural secularization: Having been the central institution of pre-
-modern societies, religious organisations are turning into rather peripheral institutions
that are not any more privileged over other institutions. Even if they maintain a pub-
lic role, as Casanova claims, this public role is in no way comparable to the historic pre-
decessors. 
Yet other European sociologists stress that the thesis of secularisation does not re-
ally cover the situation of religion in Europe.8 There is a number of societies, such as
Poland, Ireland or Italy, in which religion still plays an important role for the subjects
as well as in public life. As opposed to the new paradigm, the importance of religion
in those societies is linked to a strong monopoly of one religion. One of the reasons may
be that religion, e.g. Catholicism in Italy, succeeded to diversify internally to such a
high degree as to be able to absorb the multitude of demands in a plural society.9
Markets 
and the Popular Religion
On this background one may argue that in Europe, yet possibly not only there, the
market may function in different ways (and, I may add, on different grounds) as the
rational choice theorists assume. (Although one may add that church organisations in
Europe accepted the rational choice model so that we witness a process of self fulfill-
ing prophecy when it comes to the market of religion: It is much more created by the
churches rather than it comes about.) Religion in Europe, it seems to me, follows an-
other pattern than that conceived of by the liberal market paradigm. One may outline
the liberal model as follows: 
6Steve Bruce: Choice and Religion. A Critique of Rational Choice Theory, Oxford 1999.
7A very detailed version of the secularisation thesis is elaborated by Bruce, Steve (2002): God is Dead.
Secularization in the West. Oxford: Blackwell 2002, 5ff.
8Davie Grace: Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates, Oxford 2000; Paul M. Zulehner/ Hermann
Denz: Wie Europa lebt und glaubt. Europäische Wertestudie, Düsseldorf 1993; Sheena Ashford/ Noel Timms:
What Europe thinks. A Study of European Values, Aldershot 1992; Roland J. Campiche (Hg.): Cultures je-
unes et religions en Europe, Paris 1997; Grace Davie/ Danièle Hervieu-Léger: Identités religieuses en Europe.
Paris: La Decouverte 1996; Hubert; Knoblauch (Hg.): Europe and the Invisible Religion. Sonderheft von So-
cial Compass 2003.
9Diotallevi, Luca: Il rompicapo della secolarizzazione italiana. Caso italiano, teorie americane e revisione
del paradigma della secolarizzazione, Mailand 2001.
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Religious organisations provide supply for religious demand which is governed by
an utilitarian calculus. The more demand is being created, the more supply will be pro-
vided, adapting to the various demands by differentiating the kind of supply. Often
overlooked, communication fulfils the function of market communication, i.e. in-
forming about the supply as well as about the demand. 
It is exactly the often ignored role of communication that causes a transformation
of the model: It seems overtly simplifying to assume that market communication does
but provide exact information for action. Demand is, as we especially see in the field
of religion, regulated by symbolic meanings; one may say that religious products and
services are primarily dependent on symbolic meanings which are communicated to
the consumers in such a way as to be understood in their life-world. If we include this
symbolic dimension, the ideal surplus-value, if one may say, the above sketched model
does not suffice any more. Therefore, I propose a second, social-symbolic model that
is adapted from the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu.  
Bourdieu has shown that markets are not only regulated by demand but also by in-
stitutions that have power. Being based on legitimation, power can be seen as a pref-
erence structure for certain suppliers, whereas the lack of power handicaps other sup-
pliers who themselves try to increase the power of their symbolic supply. If they suc-
ceed, they can exchange their supplies like a symbolic capital, i.e. in becoming accepted
as part of the education system, in getting taxes from the state or in being accepted by
the media public. Markets are, Bourdieu agrees, driven by competition, but competi-
tion is not “free” but structured. One may add that even a “free market” as in the US
is a construction that presupposes a huge range of regulations freeing the market
from other influences (such as monopolization). Thus, also the religious market in-
volves state regulations, power distinctions between legal churches and illegitimate
sects – as well as ongoing changes, such as the clericalisation of Euro-Islam. 
LIBERAL MARKET MODEL
Information / communication / media / forms / interaction / feedback
Supply Demand
Demand
supply 1 Demand
Demand
supply 1” Demand
Demand
supply 1”” Demand
Demand
Demand
supply 2 Demand
supply 3 Demand
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Dissolution of the field
The second model is not to refute the first one; rather, I presume, both models are
at work at the same time, the first being implemented by religious organisation in re-
lation to assumed individual demand, the second working on the level between reli-
gious organisation and in the communication between religious and other organisa-
tions. The second field is predominantly constituted by the competition for legitima-
tion as religion. This holds for Islam (that is a religion, yet not legitimated the like in
the West) as well as for sects and new religious movements (occultism etc.).
It is interesting that Bourdieu’s model of the market extends a motive already in-
dicated by Luckmann: To both, the dynamics of religion is not restricted to the com-
petition for the legitimation as religion. Indeed, Bourdieu observed what he called the
“dissolution of the field of religion”. At the “lower” margins of the fields, actors com-
pete for the symbolic manipulation of behaviour and meaning in the private life. In this
sense, priests are not only competing with prophets and magicians, as Weber had it,
but also with psychologists, medical healers, life coaches, social workers, teachers of
holistic ways of living and even martial arts (Bourdieu 1992: 233).
In fact, especially in those societies in which religion takes on an organisational well
defined form, we witness that religious topics as well as religious behaviour is being
processed in channels and ways that extend by far the activities of these organisations.
Although not being considered as religious, religious organisations feel that they com-
pete with these topics and behaviours in a way that resembles their competition with
other religions and with sects and magics in what may be called the black market of
religion.
The competitors in this black market do not offer anything that may be labelled re-
ligion. Nevertheless what they offer may fulfil the functions of religion: Thus radical
political world views (from fascism to ecology and animal rights), aesthetic preferences
INSTITUTIONAL MARKET MODEL
FIELD OF RELIGION
“Orthodox”
symbolic
supplier supplier supplier capital
LEGIMITITY
CAPITAL
economic
Competition
“Heterodox”
suppliers
Alternative supplier
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(from Punk to modern dance), sports (from extreme sports to sports fans) and media
(from Starship enterprise to Madonna) may fulfil a religious function although they
are not religiously organised in any sense. Their organisation is, rather, defined by the
modern popular culture, cultural forms of communication that heavily depend on the
modern communication media and commercial organisation. Note that these forms are
not restricted to the media only: the modern event as well as the social structure of net-
works are also dependant on the media. It is by no accident that religious organisa-
tions adapt these forms of communication; one may even say, the more religious or-
ganisations adapt to such forms, the more they are successful, (the “conservatism” of
their use of social forms corresponding to the kind of audience attracted). 
In proposing the notion of popular religion, I do, however, not only refer to those
forms of, one may say, modern popular culture that fulfil religions functions; the title
also extends to religion in a more precise sense. In contemporary society, religious top-
ics as well as religious behaviour do not only occur in the field of religion and religious
communication. They also occur in other areas. Obviously, this includes what one may
call metaphorical religion: Madonna alluding to the crucifix as an artistic use of reli-
gion as is as metaphoric as the worship ritual of a football fan or the magic rituals of
management seminars. Metaphorical is also the understanding of “capitalism” as re-
ligion – if it does not refer to charismatic capitalism and similar phenomena. Even more
important for popular religion seems to me that topics and activities that are marked
as religious in the mémoire collective of even those who are not religious any more,
are being processed outside of religion. Thus, one may say that substantial parts of the
ultramodern culture of the dead: grieving, mourning, hospices, dead death believes
as well as rituals – are communicated outside the religious organisations. At least in
Germany, churches seem to play a minor role when it come to the question how to un-
derstand and cope with the dead – one of the basic topics of Christian religion. In a
way, popular religion may be seen as a successor to what has been called superstition.
But ignoring the fact that churches have no longer the power to ban these forms of be-
liefs and action - the popularity of this religion depends on the fact that is communi-
cated in forms generated by popular culture: Pop songs, newspaper reports, popular
novels etc.
Spirituality and Subjectivity
Rational Choice theories of religion have also been opposed by a number of schol-
ars although they acknowledge the role of the subject: In the US, Spickard and others
stress the constitutive role of subjective experience for religion which is being under-
stood in terms of Schutz’ phenomenology. 10 e 11 Experiences are considered to be the
pivot mediating between society and individual:12 “Sociology’s task is to study both
the interface of the objective social context and its bearing upon religious experience
10 Most explicitly in: Mary J. Neitz/ James V. Spickard: Steps toward a sociology of religious experience:
The theories of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Alfred Schutz, in: Sociological Analysis 51, 1 (1990), 15-33;
Alfred Schütz: Über die mannigfaltigen Wirklichkeiten, in: Theorie der Lebenswelt 1. Die pragmatische
Schichtung der Lebenswelt. Konstanz 2003,181-239.
11Lawrence A. Young (Hg.): Rational Choice and Religion. Summary and Assessment. New York and Lon-
don 1997.
12 James V. Spickard: Experiencing religious rituals. Sociological Analysis 52 (1991):191-204. 
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as well as subjective interpretations of religious experience and how they impact the
social world“. 13
The subjective dimension of religion plays also some role in the French work of
Danièle Hervieu-Léger. She considers religious experience to be a constitutive feature
of modern religious identity by which individuals are included into the collective
memory. Religion, she says, is an ideological, practical and symbolic mechanism per-
taining to a certain tradition of belief that constitutes, maintains, supports and controls
consciousness.14 To an even more radical degree Heelas and Woodhead have put for-
ward the thesis of the “spiritual revolution”.15 Whereas forms of religion that require
obedience and authority are in decline, subjective life forms of the sacred are gaining
ground. Whereas the former are declining, the latter are flourishing to such a degree
that one gets the impression of a religious revival. Heelas and Woodhead are focus-
ing particularly on what has been known as “New Age” for a long time, i.e. forms of
esoteric spirituality and magical practices which they discover to penetrate everyday
life in a normal average town. 
Whereas Heelas and Woodhead restrict themselves to so to say religions incorpo-
rating postmaterialist values (such as self-fulfilment), I would argue that the spiritual
revolution extends also to other forms. No doubt, it is particularly in Europe that sub-
jective-life forms are flourishing. In terms of religious studies, one should call them “al-
ternative religions”, since they typically draw on religious traditions that are distin-
guished from the hegemonic forms known in the European tradition: magic and “su-
perstitions”, esotericism, pagan religions, eastern religions, American, African and
Caribbean religions play a prominent role, and even if it comes to the hegemonic
Christian traditions, one prefers the long surppressed mystical and the few known
monastic expressions. Alternative religiosity is characterised by a low degree of or-
ganisation, as is most succinctly expressed in the motive of the network (sponsored by
the New Age since the early 1980s). Consequently, alternative religions are charac-
terised by a low degree of dogmatism, that is to say that there are few if any core be-
liefs shared by a huge number of believers. Most importantly, however, alternative re-
ligiosity’s centre may be seen in the chance to experience religiosity personally. The
subjective experience, thus, is not just an anthropological feature of religion, as stressed
by Glock and Luckmann; it is an idea explicitly held and institutionalised in alterna-
tive religions of the West. For this reason, one may talk about subjectivisation much
more than of spiritualisation. Stress lies not only on mystical visions, but also on al-
tered states of consciousness, peak experiences, near-death experiences, reincarnation
therapies, channelling, out-of-body experiences, spiritualism – not to mention Yoga
and Meditation practices. Since these experiences are assigned to transcendent pow-
ers, energies and spirits, they are closely connected to magical and particularly alter-
native medical and psychological healing practices – an area that constitutes the eco-
nomic pillar of alternative religions.
The subjectivity of religion is by no means marginal. Although one may admit that
it is most difficult to measure it in quantitative surveys, there are indications that a
13M. Poloma: The sociological context of religious experience, in: R. Hood (Hg.), Handbook of religious
experience. Birmingham AL 1995, 161-182, 179.
14Danièle Hervieu-Léger: La religion pour mémoire, Paris 1993, 119 (engl.: Religion as a Chain of Mem-
ory. New Brunswick 2000).
15Heelas, Paul and Linda Woodhead: The Spiritual Revolution. London: Blackwell 2004.
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growing number of people could be labelled alternative. Already in the early nineties
about one fourth of the Swiss have been identified as alternative; the numbers of be-
lievers in reincarnation is also increasing.16 Among young people, yin and yang is as-
sociated with as strong affect as is the crucifix. Nevertheless, one should stress that the
number of activists is, in general, much smaller than the distribution of beliefs, prac-
tices and subjective experiences that extends today to the majority of the population
(including church members).
In stressing the importance of the subjectivation of religion, we may discover one
parallel between alternative religions and Christian movements. (The low degree of
institutionalisation and the high degree of popularisation are further common ele-
ments.) The experiences of being reborn, i.e. the importance of a conversation experi-
ence, miracles, prophecies and other experiences are constitutive for those Christian
movements that are labelled evangelical, Pentecostal, charismatic or even fundamen-
talist. They constitute the basis for the current revitalisation of religion. Although dif-
ficult to estimate, the may be 200-300 million Pentecostals and 200-500 Million Charis-
matics (95 Million catholics in 1999). It is assumed that in a few years these movements
will constitute the majority of Christianity. 17
There is no doubt that the comparison between these Christian movements and al-
ternative spirituality should be made with prudence. However, subjectivation and
popular religion seem to be those features that most obviously allow to describe soci-
ologically the “return of the sacred” (Bell 1980). 
Conclusion: 
The myth of disenchantment
So far we have been dwelling on the description of the forms of religion that seems
to survive modernism better than ever assumed e.g. by the founders of modernity,
such as Auguste Comte or Max Weber. On this background, one may end to ask for
an explanation: Why could religion survive modernity that seemed so detrimental to
it. As a first explanation, the end of history, the end of ideologies or at least the failure
of socialist materialism and atheism may be cited. This explanation often is linked with
assumption on epochal changes, claiming a basic transformation into “postmodern”
religion. As an explanation that stressed the continuity of the development, one may
draw on cyclical models of religion; in this vein one could explain the return of the sa-
cred by generational effects that includes that the sons revolt against their atheist fa-
thers and reinvigorate their grandfathers life-forms. Whatever else may have caused
the return of the sacred – and I am sure that it is a combination of various models –
the description offered yields another component for explanation. For given the fact
16 Thus Mayer (1993: 278) found that in Switzerland the core of the „New Age activists“ only include
some thousand persons; however, the adherents of this believe amount to some fourth of the population. 
17 Barrett estimates the number of pentecostals and charismatics at about 523 million for the year 2000.
For the year 2005, he predicts some 800 million adherents. Cf. Barret (2000: 25). Brouwer u.a. (1996: 6) es-
timate, that in Latin America two thirds of protestants can be considered as pentecostals. Barret, David B.
(2000): Annual Statistical Table on Global Mission, in: International Bulletin of Missionary Research Jan-
uary, 1ff. Brouwer, Steve, Paul Gifford and Susan D. Rose (1996): Exporting the American Gospel: Global
Christian Fundamentalism. New York: Routledge.
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that contemporary religion is characterised by a fundamental change of form – would
one not have to assume that religion was never really endangered? Instead of ousting
religion, secularisation would not have meant the dead but the transformation of re-
ligion, and religion, as it turned out, has never been opposed to modernity but was ever
an integral part of modern society.
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